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I. INTRODUCTION
For many years, law schools have based most of their "practical"
instruction on the adversary system's last choice: trials and appeals.
First year students are taught how to write an appellate brief and how
to make an appellant argument. Maybe this is good, since the odds
are that any given student will never again write a brief or make such
an argument. After the first year of law school, students are swept
into trial advocacy courses, mock trial competitions, and appellate ad-
vocacy competitions: learning how to influence the minds of jurors and
appellate judges. We all know that these activities do more than train
advocates, and that is fine, but when less than five percent of all filed
civil cases go to trial, we believe that some of the practical emphasis
should be on the cases that do not go to trial or even on problems that
do not reach the level of a law suit. Most disputes are settled at some
stage of the process. Some are even settled after trial or appeal. Why
not include the study of how to represent a client in a settlement pro-
cess as a regular part of the law school curriculum: learning how to
influence the minds of other parties?
This paper will guide the reader through the legal settlement pro-
cess stage by stage but will first show an opposing "twitch" that comes
from the traditional law school training noted above, emphasized by
television and motion picture portrayals of lawyers: zealous advocates
in a trial setting (read: warrior) with fights to the finish, flags waving,
and trumpets blaring the Deguello. Of course, few people consider
the reason for those showings on commercial media. Quiet discus-
sions between lawyers, the back and forth process in mediations, or
conferences concerning the wording of a contract do not make lively,
exciting entertainment that would draw viewers and win awards. But




Once the "twitch" has been calmed, this paper will show ways to
really be a zealous advocate for a client in negotiation, mediation, and
other settlement procedures. This paper will also show the process of
how to persuade, influence, and convince others without injury and
how to be a zealous advocate in order to obtain the best result for
your client.
There is art in persuasion, and there is science. The art is some-
times referred to as emotional intelligence and is exemplified by he-
roes such as Abraham Lincoln, Winston Churchill, and Clarence
Darrow. The art and power of rhetoric in trial advocacy can be taught
and is backed by science composed of years of jurisprudential re-
search and writing. The art and power of negotiation and settlement
advocacy can also be taught and is backed by a science composed of a
solid multi-disciplinary base of research and writing.
II. THE FEARSOME OGRE OF "ZEALOUS ADVOCACY"
Many lawyers refuse to consider anything but complete victory in a
dispute because they have been trained to be "Zealous Advocates."
To them, to be "zealous"' is to fight to the bitter end, even though that
end may be defeat.2 To consider something between victory and de-
feat would be wimpy. They will even defend that position by saying
that it is unethical to do otherwise. Where do they get that idea?
More than likely they get that idea from the statement that "[a]s [an]
advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the
rules of the adversary system."3 However, this statement is taken out
of context. The relevant portions of the preamble to the Texas Disci-
plinary Rules of Professional Conduct read:
2. As a representative of clients, a lawyer performs various func-
tions. As advisor, a lawyer provides a client with an informed un-
derstanding of the client's legal rights and obligations and explains
their practical implications. As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts
the client's position under the rules of the adversary system. As
1. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1488
(William Morris ed., 1969) (defining "zealous" as "[f]illed with or motivated by zeal;
ardent; enthusiastic; fervent. See synonyms at 'eager[,]"' and defining "zealot" as
"[o]ne who is zealous; a fanatically committed person; See synonyms at 'fanatic"'); see
also THE COMPACT OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 3868 (24th prtg. in U.S.
1985) (defining "zealous" as "[f]ull of or incited by zeal; characterized by zeal or pas-
sionate ardour; fervently devoted to the promotion of some person or cause; intensely
earnest; actively enthusiastic[,]" and defining "zealot" as "[o]ne who is zealous or full
of zeal; one who pursues his object with passionate ardour; usually in disparaging
sense, one who is carried away by excess of zeal; an immoderate partisan, a fanatical
enthusiast").
2. See Judge David Evans, The Dangers of Zealous Advocacy, Tarrant County
Bar Association CLE Seminar Series, September 24, 2004.
3. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT preamble 2, reprinted in TEX.
GOV'T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G app. A (Vernon 1998) (TEX. STATE BAR R. art. X,
§ 9) (emphasis added).
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negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client but
consistent with requirements of honest dealing with others .. .
3. In all professional functions, a lawyer should zealously pursue
clients' interests within the bounds of the law. In doing so, a lawyer
should be competent, prompt and diligent .... 5
9. Each lawyer's own conscience is the touchstone against which to
test the extent to which his actions may rise above the disciplinary
standards prescribed by these rules. The desire for the respect and
confidence of the members of the profession and of the society
which it serves provides the lawyer the incentive to attain the high-
est possible degree of ethical conduct. The possible loss of that re-
spect and confidence is the ultimate sanction. So long as its
practitioners are guided by these principles, the law will continue to
be a noble profession. This is its greatness and its strength, which
permit of no compromise.
6
The functions of advisor and negotiator are no less important than
that of advocate and include such duties as informing a client of vari-
ous rules, rights, and possibilities and, most importantly, informing the
client of the requirement of honest dealing with others. These duties
are reinforced by the rules themselves. Rule 1.03 requires a lawyer to
keep a client informed about the status of a matter and to explain the
matter so as "to permit the client to make informed decisions .... "I
Rule 3.03 is entitled "Candor Toward the Tribunal" and provides
that "[a] lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of mate-
rial fact or law to a tribunal, [nor] fail to disclose a fact to a tribunal
when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent
act,... [nor] offer or use evidence that a lawyer knows to be false."8
What many lawyers do not comprehend is that a tribunal is "any gov-
ernmental body or official or any other person engaged in a process of
resolving a particular dispute or controversy."9 Tribunals are "courts
and administrative agencies when engaging in adjudicatory or licens-
ing activities as defined by applicable law or rules of practice or proce-
dure, as well as judges, magistrates, special masters, referees,
arbitrators, mediators, hearing officers, and comparable persons em-
powered to resolve or to recommend a resolution of a particular
matter."'1
The issue of candor is repeated in Rule 4.01, which provides that:
[i]n the course of representing a client[,] a lawyer shall not know-
ingly make a false statement of material fact or law to a third per-
son[, nor] fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when
4. Id. at preamble 2 (emphasis added).
5. Id. at preamble 3 (emphasis added).
6. Id. at preamble 9.
7. Id. at Rule 1.03.
8. Id. at Rule 3.03.
9. Id. at terminology.
10. Id. (emphasis added).
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disclosure is necessary to avoid making the lawyer a party to a crim-
inal act or knowingly assisting a fraudulent act perpetrated by a
client."
The duty of honesty must be kept in mind when considering the
further duty of a lawyer to inform the appropriate disciplinary author-
ity when he knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of
the rules "that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty
[or] trustworthiness . "... 12
The Preface to the recent Ethical Guidelines for Settlement Negoti-
ations from the Section of Litigation of the American Bar Association
states:
Settlement negotiations are an essential part of litigation. In light of
the courts' encouragement of alternative dispute resolution and in
light of the ever increasing cost of litigation, the majority of cases
are resolved through settlement. The settlement process necessarily
implicates many ethical issues. Resolving these issues and deter-
mining a lawyer's professional responsibilities are important aspects
of the settlement process and justify special attention to lawyers'
ethical duties as they relate to negotiation of settlements.
These Guidelines are written for lawyers who represent private par-
ties in settlement negotiations in civil cases .... The Guidelines
should apply to settlement discussions whether or not a third party
neutral is involved .... As a general rule ... the involvement of a
third party neutral in the settlement process does not change the
attorneys' ethical obligations.13
The substantive portions of the Guidelines echo the Texas Rules on
honest and fair dealing generally 14 with courts15 and with third per-
sons16 and adds an important duty that "[i]n the settlement context, a
lawyer should not exploit an opposing party's material mistake of fact
that was induced by the lawyer or the lawyer's client and... may need
to disclose information to the extent necessary to prevent ... reliance
on the.., mistake ... .,"17 The Guidelines also require "[a] lawyer [to]
consider and ... discuss with the client, promptly after retention in a
dispute, and[,] thereafter, possible alternatives to conventional litiga-
tion, including settlement."' 8
A lawyer is not just a hired gun committed to a fight to the finish.
A lawyer should consider himself to be a professional retained to do
11. Id. at Rule 4.01.
12. Id. at Rule 8.03 (emphasis added).
13. SECTION OF LITIG., ABA, Ethical Guidelines for Settlement Negotiations § 1, at
1 (Aug. 2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/litigation/ethics/settlementnegotia-
tions.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2004) (on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review).
14. Id. §§ 2.1, 2.3, at 2-4.
15. Id. § 2.5, at 5-6 (stating that a "[f]ailure to make such disclosure is not excused
by the lawyer's ethical duty otherwise to preserve the client's confidences").
16. Id. §§ 4.1.1, 4.1.2, at 34-37.
17. Id. § 4.3.5, at 56.
18. Id. § 3.1.1, at 7-8.
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what should be done for the client. If settlement through negotiation
or some form of ADR is best for the client, then that is what should
be done. If settlement fails, then a lawyer should be the best litigation
advocate that he can be. In either case, a lawyer should prepare him-
self and the client for the proper process. Just as the lawyer and client
have to be prepared to testify if litigation occurs, the lawyer and client
have to be prepared for negotiation, mediation, or other forms of
ADR. For some lawyers, wearing the "gorilla suit" of trial advocacy
while carrying the olive branch of peaceful resolution is impossible.
For some personalities, trial activities are more suitable while for
others, reasoned, creative efforts to end disputes and create deals are
both appropriate and comfortable. A client needs both sets of skills.
Lawyers and law firms can meet these quite different objectives by
providing specialists in both fields. Law schools must equip future
lawyers with settlement advocacy expertise as well as trial and appel-
late advocacy skills. Now, let us examine some of those skills.
III. EFFECTIVE SETTLEMENT ADVOCACY
Persuasion can be accomplished through the use of power, rights, or
collaborative problem solving. The use of power carries risks of im-
passe and injury to relationships. Persuasion of a judge or jury that
one party is right and the other wrong is a high stakes gamble: some-
one will always be a loser. Both of these methods are costly. The
history of negotiation in the shadow of the law reflects delays, high
costs, and the risk of loss. Mediation and other forms of ADR were
introduced to alleviate those costs and reflect a collaborative, rather
than adversarial, method of problem solving.
A. Influencing the Minds of Conflict Partners
Although the arts of persuasion and negotiation are powerful tools
for influencing others, they have palpable limits. Mastery of either or
both does not guarantee success for advocates. In transactions and
disputes, lawyers and clients make choices: shall we use power, for
example, economic leverage, or a strike rally? Shall we focus on who
is right under the law or on morality or on fairness norms? Shall we
negotiate from an interest-based perspective and attempt to create
value which can be appropriately allocated in a problem-solving pro-
cess? Shall we bring in a transformative facilitator to provide an op-
portunity for the parties to become empowered, to make their own
decisions, and develop ground rules based on their own values and
perceptions of the problem and each other?
In a dispute that has escalated to the level of litigation, we typically
first use negotiation or its cousin, mediation, as the preferred type of
interpersonal communication. Even after that process decision has
been made, many other questions arise. What style of negotiation is
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best suited to this case: adversarial or problem-solving? What tactics
should we use in the distributive bargaining phase of negotiation:
competitive or cooperative? How much involvement, if any, should
our client have and how should her role be defined? Is there a partic-
ular strategy that will increase our effectiveness? Does negotiation
theory have a useful application in settling a lawsuit? Should the set-
tlement advocate strive for objectives beyond just settling the lawsuit?
What financial incentives could be created to more closely align the
interests of the client and those of the lawyer?
There is now a modern ritual for effective conflict resolution that
unfolds in predictable stages. In the beginning, a client's feelings and
needs are identified so that many possibilities for meeting those needs
can be created. Clients are then given an opportunity to tell their own
story in their own way, clearing the way for an exchange of proposals.
The proposals can then be evaluated in a rational manner with the
help of the lawyer and the mediator. Clients can be empowered either
to accept or to reject final offers or to settle. In the end, once tenta-
tive closure has been reached, further opportunity for additional value
for each side can be sought before the final agreement is written and
signed. This ritual has been developed in the past twenty or more
years in Texas and the rest of the nation in response to perceived inad-
equacies in legal procedures and remedies.
B. History of Settlement Science: Law and Social Science
At the 2004 annual meeting of the American Bar Association Alter-
native Dispute Resolution Section, a legal educator's colloquium fo-
cused on some of these inadequacies under the heading: The Interface
Between Negotiation Theory and Mediation Practice.19 This meeting
came near the end of a semester in which the course, Settlement Ad-
vocacy, was first taught by the authors of this piece at Texas Wesleyan
University School of Law. After the authors' combined experience of
many arbitrations and mediations during thirty years of mediation
practice, eighty-seven years of law practice, fifty-two years of teaching
law students, and hundreds of hours of attending dispute resolution
programs and training, some questions seem particularly important to
answer or at least to ponder. The necessity for specialized settlement
advocacy training is not apparent to many lawyers, since most of
whom believe themselves to be excellent negotiators because they set-
tle ninety-five percent of their lawsuits and consider a split-the-differ-
ence compromise of the extreme financial positions taken during legal
negotiations to be an acceptable outcome.
19. Bobbi McAdoo et al., The Interface Between Negotiation Theory and Media-
tion Practice, Address at the American Bar Association Section of Dispute Resolu-
tion: The Sixth Annual Conference Resolution and Resilience in New York (Apr. 17,
2004).
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Until quite recently, research and writing in the related fields of
conflict resolution, communication, negotiation, and the psychology of
influence have come more from social scientists than from lawyers.
Perhaps this is an explanation for the general resistance to use more
sophisticated techniques in negotiation and the settlement of law suits:
most practicing lawyers simply never read the abundant literature
which would inform them of a paradigm shift. If the only objective of
an advocate is to make the deal or end the lawsuit, why bother to
update our skills? We are already achieving those objectives. The
phenomenon of collaborative law and the institutionalization of ADR
in many Texas courts, agencies, and organizations point to an expan-
sion of consciousness in consumers and their lawyers. For many grad-
uating law students, expertise in these new areas of law practice is
necessary as law firms, corporations, and government employers be-
come more frequent and sophisticated users of ADR and market their
competency in these areas.
From a therapeutic justice20 or peacemaking perspective, conflict
can be an opportunity for the creation of mutual gain, personal
growth, redefinition of the issues, and enhancement of an existing re-
lationship that is threatened. These goals are not inconsistent with
traditional advocacy; in fact, they are implicit in the ancient role law-
yers have always played: protecting the client and society. The meth-
ods used to resolve conflict will determine if these objectives are met.
The alternative is to continue to be content with mere split-the-differ-
ence compromise, less than optimal results for our clients, and a nega-
tive image in our society.
Until recently, the impact of negotiation analysis on the legal pro-
fession has been relatively slight when compared to the "juggernaut of
adjudication analysis that dominates the legal horizon. ' '21 Even in the
orientation to law school, before the first classes in contracts or torts,
we come to value a command of trial procedure. We are now being
told that the civil trial to a jury is an endangered species. Despite
more civil law suits being filed in the last decade than in the previous
decade,22 only three percent actually are tried. 3 Why are we spend-
ing so much valuable class time training for a vanishing process? The
civil trial will never disappear, but more attention needs to be given to
20. Hon. John Coselli, Address at Problem Solving Processes: Peacemakers and
the Law (Apr. 30, 2004) (Therapeutic Justice is a concept that is finding particular
favor with family judges. It is characterized by a concern for the welfare of the society
at large, and third parties to the lawsuit (such as the children in a custody hearing)
rather than a narrow focus on which of the litigants should prevail based on legal or
factual arguments and proof).
21. CHARLES B. WIGGINS & L. RANDOLPH LOWRY, NEGOTIATIONS AND SETTLE-
MENT ADVOCACY: A BOOK OF READINGS, at v (1997).
22. Id. at 40 (alluding to the fact that civil litigators complained of the increasingly
uncivil behavior of other civil litigators).
23. Hon. Ed Kinkeade, Address at Problem Solving Processes: Peacemakers and
the Law (Apr. 30, 2004).
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negotiation analysis and the creation of faster, cheaper, better out-
comes for our clients. The responsibility for this lies with law schools.
In the last two decades, research and writing in the field of under-
standing conflict and eliminating barriers to successful negotiation and
dispute resolution have blossomed.24 No one discipline or level of
analysis is sufficient for this work. Lawyers benefit from the contin-
ued research focusing on conceptual analysis, theory building, and ap-
plication. From that work, some concerns and issues have emerged
that form the basis for this monograph. We will address four of those
issues in this section: brainstorming, the stories, demands, and deci-
sion making. It has been said that the knowledge base from scholarly
output operates like an expensive perfume because "[w]hile the fra-
grance of sound bargaining knowledge may be universal, the scent
takes on the individual characteristics of each bargainer's personality
"25
C. Is It Critical to the Success of a Mediation to Have the Parties
Brainstorm as Many Options as Possible Before Deciding on
the "Solution"?
One step in the classic integrative bargaining process articulated by
Roger Fisher and William Ury26 is to brainstorm as many options as
possible to meet the previously identified interests of the parties. The
purpose of this activity is to create value or opportunities for mutual
gain from which the parties will later produce actual proposals for set-
tlement. The creation of options is supposed to be an exercise in free
association without evaluation. However, evaluation of options fre-
quently coincides with brainstorming due to several psychological
phenomena, one of which is known as reactive devaluation. In a medi-
ation, one party will hear an option from the other side and may im-
mediately devalue it in reaction to the competitive climate and in the
belief that, if the idea came from the opposition, it must be suspect.
27
While having many options on the table from all stakeholders is an
important ingredient in creating value, the problem of reactive deval-
uation can have a negative impact on the mutual gain perceived.
One operational solution is to have the parties generate options in
separate rooms and then to have the mediator or a spokesperson for
24. Kay Elkins-Elliott & Frank W. Elliott, Introduction to Chapter 1 of the ALTER-
NATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION HANDBOOK: ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
SECTION, STATE BAR OF TEXAS 1, 10 (Kay Elkins-Elliott & Frank W. Elliott eds., 3d
ed. 2003) (noting research and writing in the ADR field since the Pound Conference
as 3,988 books on mediation, 2,910 books on negotiation, and 2,376 books on conflict
resolution).
25. WIGGINS & LOWRY, supra note 23, at vi.
26. ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES 60-62 (Bruce Patton ed.,
Penguin Books 2d ed. 1991) (1981).
27. Robert H. Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail: An Exploration of Barriers to the
Resolution of Conflict, 8 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 235, 246-47 (1993).
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each stakeholder group communicate the preferred options as merely
areas for discussion which are likely to be attractive to the other party.
The mediator may even be instructed to convey some of the favored
options to the other party as the mediator's hypothetical ideas for
ways to meet the parties' interests. This reframing of the options
could preclude or diminish reactive devaluation. After the initial
presentation of ideas for meeting the parties' needs, the evaluation of
those options could then be accomplished in joint session, where the
comparisons to reference points or expectations could be aired, or in
caucus, where the mediator could interject some rational methods of
evaluation based on actual value.
It is useful for all clients, particularly sophisticated business profes-
sionals and anyone with negotiation expertise, to be prepared by the
advocate to participate fully by bringing to the table many ideas for
resolving the joint problem the parties share. 8 Often, options gener-
ated by one side will duplicate or be complementary to options gener-
ated by the other, particularly when the clients have spent sufficient
time in preparing for the process. Although the processes differ, ad-
vocates should coach their clients to be eloquent and creative partici-
pants in the settlement process just as they would prepare the client
for success on the witness stand.
Clients can also be coached to listen actively and openly without
critiquing the ideas of the other side in order to get useful ideas on the
table. Advocates should present options strategically to the other
party or the mediator to gain any possible advantage for their client.
There may be low-cost-for-our-side but high-value-to-the-other-side
options (value-creating trades) that provide benefits for both parties.
In order to prevent leaking strategic information, strong preference
for one option over another should not be disclosed until the final
phases of negotiation. While openness and creativity are important, a
strategic plan should be formulated and followed to achieve as much
of the joint value as possible. All of these techniques represent zeal-
ous, ethical, and effective advocacy.
Another type of devaluation occurs when recipients of an option for
settlement compare it with a result achieved in a separate, but similar,
negotiation. This may arise because a disputant will speak with fam-
ily, friends, or colleagues about a prospective negotiation or mediation
and will be told what they have achieved in a supposed similar situa-
tion. Knowledge of that other process may lead the disputant to ex-
pect an equal or better outcome in her own process, even though each
negotiation has its own unique mix of human dynamics, facts, exoge-
nous climate, and alternatives. Anchoring is the cognitive process of
determining value based on some reference point in the negotiator's
28. HAROLD I. ABRAMSON, MEDIATION REPRESENTATION 191-92 (Anthony J.
Bocchino et al. eds., 2004).
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mind or by comparing an offer to a predetermined reservation price in
the current negotiation.29 Dispute resolution scholars have noted that
this tendency to link current options and offers to past events impedes
rational decision-making and frustrates the point of brainstorming: to
create opportunities for mutual gain." The settlement advocate
should be prepared to explain each option in terms of value to the
other side and urge that in the brainstorming phase of negotiation,
option generation just be a trigger for creative thinking rather than a
suspicious interchange. When the options suggested by the advocate
are discounted because she is not neutral, the mediator can accom-
plish the same objectives.
Negotiators tend to be more risk-averse to a perceived loss than to
a possible gain, even though a rational person would simply weigh the
probabilities and the expected outcome of each transaction and make
decisions based on statistics.31 Since the negotiator is not a computer,
many factors impact decision making such as reactive devaluation,
anchoring, risk preference, and attitude toward the other party to
name a few of these factors. Skilled advocates craft options in lan-
guage that minimizes the irrational, distorted reception they may re-
ceive at the bargaining table. Settlement advocates prepare for the
psychological aspects of bargaining just as assiduously as they prepare
their presentation concerning the facts and the law, and they coach
their clients to actively assist in the creation of mutual gain from
which optimal outcomes arise. In choreographing the mediation or
negotiation process, settlement advocates should devise a representa-
tion plan that reflects the functions of the forum for the client. Imple-
menting this plan will shape the process itself along lines that best
serve each client's needs in the particular fact pattern at issue: the
form of the process follows its function.
D. Do the Parties (Clients) Need to Tell Their Stories in Joint
Session for the Mediation to Succeed?
A disputant should have an experience of justice as well as an end
to conflict. Constitutional guarantees focus on procedural fairness,
the opportunity to be heard in a public trial, and the opportunity to be
judged either by a jury of our peers or a public official who is neu-
tral.3" These rights are precious and define to many the essence of
what makes American jurisprudence superior to other systems. These
days, the right remains, but its actualization is rare. Long before trial
day, many Texas litigants are ordered to mediation, where most mat-
29. See Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation
Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107, 138-42 (1994).
30. See id. at 139.
31. RUSSELL KOROBKIN, NEGOTIATION THEORY AND STRATEGY 45 (2002).
32. See Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What's Jus-
tice Got To Do with It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 791 (2001).
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ters settle. The modern courthouse is multi-doored33 because courts
are unable to try every case on their dockets. How then does the dis-
putant experience justice?
When ordered to mediation or when voluntarily choosing it, most
lawyers prefer a mediator who will bypass or eliminate joint sessions,
giving the clients no opportunity to tell their story to the other real
decision-makers in the process. There are many strategic and philo-
sophical justifications for this practice, withholding information that
may be crucial to winning at trial being the most obvious. How can
this concern be addressed while giving the client an opportunity to tell
her story?
1. Why Telling One's Story Is Crucial to the Mediation Process
A client can achieve some sense of justice by telling her story in
caucus to a mediator who really listens and does not interrupt, criti-
cize, or cross examine her. The mediator cannot reveal any informa-
tion to the other party unless authorized to do so,34 and the client may
perceive this court-appointed neutral as a substitute for a judge. The
client may really want to receive an apology, have feelings validated,
or just be heard by the party she believes wronged her. If the advo-
cate has not prepared her for this opportunity, or does not believe the
client can speak without weakening the case, the mediator may be
asked to convey the story and bring back an apology or at least a
validation of the client's perception of the dispute. In some cases, this
acknowledgment may be as important as a monetary settlement.35
In a recent probate case, a brother and sister were left two pieces of
property, one as a tenancy in common and the other, which included a
house, as a life estate to the brother with remainder to the sister. The
siblings had been raised in an atmosphere of physical violence, alco-
holism, and emotional neglect. At the time of the mediation, the sib-
lings had not communicated with each other in over two years. The
process was structured to allow the brother, a violent and somewhat
low functioning individual, to speak directly to his sister about his per-
ception of his deprived childhood. The sister was willing to be an at-
tentive listener for as long as was necessary in order to be able to
reach a place where decisions could be made. Because the brother
33. See Frank E. A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111, 130-31
(1976) (The concept of the multi-door courthouse was first proposed by Professor
Frank Sander of Harvard. This concept refers to the practice of using the process
which best suits the problem. After the Pound Conference in 1976, court connected
alternative resolution programs were created.).
34. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.053(b) (Vernon 1997 & Supp.
2004-2005).
35. See Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apology-Help or Hindrance?, DisP. RESOL.
MAG., Spring 2004, at 33, 33-34. See generally THANE ROSENBAUM, THE MYTH OF




was empowered to speak, and the sister was willing to give empathy
and attention, the parties were both able to recognize their own and
the other's interests. The sister did not want any of the property, only
money. The brother wanted to own the house and receive very little
money because of the possible effect on disability income. Their
strong preferences promoted tradeoffs that were valuable to each.
The sister got more than half of the cash from the sale of the vacant
property, and the brother got the remainder interest in the house.
Joint session was used during most of the mediation. Because most of
the day was spent telling and listening to the life stories, and the sto-
ries disclosed the siblings' perceptions, feelings, and interests, little
time needed to be spent in haggling about money details. At the end
of the process, the siblings hugged and made plans to visit in the fu-
ture. The relational aspects of the process, past and future, could not
have been resolved in a caucus setting. The parties resolved the finan-
cial aspects of the dispute more completely than any judge could have
ordered.
2. How Advocates Can Ensure that Clients Feel Validated
It is the responsibility of the settlement advocate and the mediator
to design, manage, and deliver an experience that will meet a client's
expectation of procedural justice and result in satisfaction with the
process and long-term compliance with the settlement.36 Parties need
to believe that they influence each other and the ultimate decision.
Although a mediator has no actual power to decide, parties perceive
court-annexed neutrals as having the imprimatur of the court system
with which they are associated. Unfortunately, "[1]awyers regularly
fail to appreciate and accommodate their clients' need to tell their
stories."37 Settlement advocates would be wise to temper their pri-
mary need for an expeditious settlement with some consideration for
their clients' needs to be valued members of a society and for self-
determination in their own dispute.38
In a recent partnership mediation involving the failure of one of the
partners to pay the other the agreed amount at dissolution, the law-
yers first refused to allow their clients to participate in a joint session.
When the partnership was working, one partner was the creative de-
signer, and the other kept the books and attracted new business. The
dissolution involved the designer's buying out the business partner.
The mediator began to suspect that the parties would profit from be-
ing able to address each other directly, and the lawyers agreed. In the
joint session, the designer admitted that he had not paid because ever
since the dissolution, the business did not generate enough income to
36. See Welsh, supra note 32, at 791-92.
37. Id. at 854.
38. ABRAMSON, supra note 28 at 186-87.
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discharge the contractual obligation. In response to questions from
the mediator, the business partner admitted that she was often asked
for referrals to a designer but refused to refer any business to some-
one who owed her money and was on the other side of a lawsuit. This
exchange led to an enhanced working relationship in which each party
was able to help the other. The business partner agreed to refer new
business to the designer, who agreed to pay the first $30,000 received
from that business to honor the debt. The business partner also
agreed to find and train a replacement for herself in the business, free-
ing the designer to do what he did best. Each acknowledged the value
of the prior relationship and paid respect to the other's talent.
If that mediation had continued to be an exercise in legal negotia-
tion, which was characterized by separate caucus sessions, the domina-
tion of lawyers, and the solutions generated by the lawyers and the
mediators, the clients' mutuallly beneficial, collaborative outcome
would not have been achieved. Every case must be considered on its
own merits: the relationship the parties had, the respect they may still
feel for each other, their complementary needs, the strengths and
weaknesses of their legal positions, their cognitive intelligence, emo-
tional intelligence, and numerous other factors. Advocates and
mediators, working as a team, must structure every mediation in light
of those contextual facts.
Very few litigants get to tell their story in a courtroom. Many now
expect to get that opportunity in a mediation that is being mandated
by the court. If that expectation is not met, the current esteem in
which mediation is generally held could be diminished, and that could
even "tarnish the legitimacy and authority of the courts."39 Collabo-
rative lawyers, some advocates, and many mediators understand and
accommodate this need. All settlement advocates must do so.
40
The need to tell the story and influence the other party is true for
people of all cultures, for example, the Navajo Peacemaker Court and
the Peoples' Courts of China. People in conflict, irrespective of their
cultural values, need considerate treatment by third parties in author-
ity (judges, police), even-handed, dignified treatment by decision
makers (judges, arbitrators, other parties, juries), and an opportunity
for voice. These social needs matter even more to most disputants
than the substantive outcome of the processes. Citizens consider
39. Welsh, supra note 32, at 861.
40. ABRAMSON, supra note 28, at 187 (The traditional relationship between lawyer
and client is that the client unloads the story onto the lawyer and then returns to
business. Lawyers like this arrangement because it lets them do what they do best:
deal with legal problems. In mediation, this behavior does not always work because,
in many cases, the clients need to interact with each other. Selecting a mediator who




themselves to be the "clients" of public servants.4' Settlement
processes will be successful to the extent they meet the need for voice.
E. If the Parties Make Their Proposals for Resolution Directly to
Each Other, Does the Mediation Have a Better Chance
of Success?
Parties need to tell their stories to someone other than just their
lawyer, but the decision to have clients make proposals at the bargain-
ing table raises different issues. When the bargaining process reaches
the distributive phase where value is being claimed, certain psycholog-
ical, strategic, and organizational barriers must be considered.4" In
formulating a mediation representation plan to overcome or minimize
these barriers, settlement advocates will accomplish four tasks: (1)
choosing a negotiation approach consistent with creative problem
solving; (2) setting clear objectives and goals that meet the parties'
interests; (3) determining how to use the mediator most effectively;
and (4) deciding when to use certain techniques at each key junction
in the mediation process.43 Within this framework, the offering of
proposals for actual deals should be postponed until after interests,
options, and psychological issues have been fully addressed. This se-
quence may be frustrating for the other party who is anxiously waiting
for the first real offer which will signal the essence of the "real" nego-
tiation. Unless all clients are coached on the process, and the media-
tor's style is consistent with a problem-solving approach, having
proposals occur late in the process will be puzzling and may make
everyone impatient. There may be tension between lawyers and cli-
ents whose interests are in conflict because lawyers usually prefer to
do protracted discovery to gain leverage and properly evaluate the
41. See James W. Gibson, Mediating Criminal Conflict, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION HANDBOOK: ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION SECTION, STATE BAR
OF TEXAS 203, 203-04 (Kay Elkins-Elliott & Frank W. Elliott eds., 3d ed. 2003) (ex-
plaining the process of criminal mediation and citing M. UM13REIT & J. GREENWOOD,
UNIV. OF MINN. SCH. OF SOC. WORK, NATIONAL SURVEY OF VICTIM OFFENDER ME-
DIATION PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (1998)) (There were 289 victim of-
fender mediation programs identified of which eighty-one percent reported working
with juvenile offenders and their victims). The Truth and Reconciliation Hearings in
South Africa, conducted after apartheid was abolished, illustrate this process, and the
deep need to air wrongs and to be given a full, compassionate, and public hearing.
During these hearings, citizens were present and allowed to gain emotional closure
when public servants confessed, and in some cases apologized, for violations of
human rights and for violations of law. No reprisals or punishments were allowed in
the proceedings. This process used during the Truth and Reconciliation Hearings in
South Africa, on a grand scale, resembles the model for Victim Offender Mediation
used in Texas and many other states. Furthermore, an active juvenile mediation pro-
gram exists in Fort Worth, Texas, supported by Judge Jean Boyd and staffed by volun-
tary mediators through Dispute Resolution Service of North Texas.
42. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lee Ross, Introduction, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT
RESOLUTION 2, 22-23 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995).
43. ABRAMSON, supra note 28, at 154-62.
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chances of winning in court. Clients may not be comfortable paying
for this part of litigation but will still expect the lawyer to tell them
what the case is worth. Here, a skilled mediator can point out to both
parties their shared interests and the advantages of having a defined
bargaining zone to work within and the advantages of minimizing le-
gal fees, and the costs of experts, by stipulating to certain realities for
the purpose of settlement.
1. Defining the Bargaining Zone
Settlement advocates, even with minimal discovery, can usually esti-
mate the expected value of a case. In most situations, the advocates
should make proposals after consultation with their clients or should
enlist the help of the mediator. The advocate can always use confi-
dentiality as a way to keep information from the other party, and the
mediator has additional layers of confidentiality to bolster the auction
activity. The mediator can also expand the bargaining zone by point-
ing to opportunities for relationship enhancement, future business
revenue, the value of in-kind services, trade-offs of preferences, low-
ered transaction costs, and the value of not risking a public loss at
trial. Primarily, the mediator can educate the parties to the existence
of common barriers to settlement and work through or around them
in a way that the parties and their lawyers cannot do because they are
partisan.44
2. The Transformative Model
From a different perspective, transformative mediators consciously
reject responsibility for generating or reframing proposals in favor of
calling attention to the process opportunities for empowering the par-
ties.45 Mediators using this approach will encourage the parties them-
selves to behave in any way they choose consistent with their own
empowerment and recognition of the problem and their relationship
to it. Parties are not directed to solve their problems in a structured,
problem solving sequence but to recognize each other's needs and val-
ues, to hear the other party's perceptions and feelings, and to cele-
brate small, incremental improvements in understanding the conflict
environment and the consensus process.
This type of process can and often does occur with no advocates
present, for example, the transformative employment mediation pro-
gram of the United States Postal Service. The mediator does not con-
vey offers because most transformative mediators use a joint session
model with no or rare caucuses. There is no reason, however, that
44. See Mnookin & Ross, supra note 42, at 22-23.
45. See Joseph P. Folger & Robert A. Baruch Bush, Transformative Mediation and
Third Party Intervention: Ten Hallmarks of a Transformative Approach To Practice, 13
MEDIATION Q. 263, 267 (1996).
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properly trained settlement advocates could not promote such a medi-
ation style and could not be a meaningful part of it. In one mediation
observed by the Author, board certified family litigators sat by for
eight hours in joint session while their clients, aided by a transforma-
tive mediator, worked through issues involving domestic violence,
joint managing conservatorship of two children, and visitation. The
advocates were supportive, cautious, and able to promote this type of
process, which the parties requested, while protecting their clients' fi-
nancial and psychological interests. These parties and their lawyers
had a common and overwhelming interest: to protect their children
from protracted conflict.
Whether the parties, their lawyers, or the mediator convey propos-
als is a function of the mediator's style and, therefore, depends on
what mediator is chosen by the participants. The success of the collab-
orative or transformative process depends in part on how the partici-
pants define success.
3. Framing Proposals Effectively
When lawyers offer proposals to each other, with or without the
mediator's assistance, as an implementation of the representation plan
prepared before mediation, there is an opportunity to frame the offers
in a way that is most likely to be positively perceived. Rational eco-
nomic analysis suggests an offeree should be sensitive to the actual
financial impact of offers on the client's balance sheet, but research
shows that other factors intervene. Behavioral decision theorists have
demonstrated empirically46 that lawyers who describe offers in terms
of gains rather than losses can influence the other party's receptivity.
Lawyers tend to craft statements to avoid admitting liability or re-
vealing any bargaining weakness (avoidance of a negative), but law-
yers are not as skilled in framing offers that are likely to be accepted
because they suggest value (pursuit of a positive). Prospect theory is a
term for the phenomenon of risk preference in conditions of uncer-
tainty and assumes that people's tolerance for risk (risk preference)
differs for gains and losses. Researchers have documented a system-
atic preference for receiving $1,000 for sure to a fifty-fifty chance of
receiving $2,000 or nothing, even though a computer would rank these
outcomes as identical.47 Studies show that the loss of $1,000 is more
than half as painful to the possessor as losing $2,000, and people will
prefer to risk a fifty percent probability of losing the $2,000 or losing
nothing to the certain loss of $1,000 because they are more risk-seek-
ing in conditions of medium probability losses. This may not be ra-
tional, but it is very human. How can advocates use the information
46. See Richard Birke & Craig R. Fox, Psychological Principles in Negotiating
Civil Settlements, 4 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 1, 43 (1999).
47. See id. at 43-44 (noting that people are generally risk-averse to medium
probability gains).
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that potential losses affect choices more often than potential commen-
surate gains to achieve optimal outcomes?
People usually require a fifty percent chance of gaining much more
($200 to $300 more to be exact) than the $100 they have a fifty percent
chance of losing.48 An advocate can propose tradeoffs for mutual gain
that minimize any perception of actual loss. For the unemployed wife
in a divorce case, framing an offer as a way to pay more dollars into
her budget for her three children because it is characterized as ali-
mony (a tax credit) sounds better than pointing out that the payor gets
a tax advantage because he is in a much higher marginal tax bracket
than his spouse. Both parties financially benefit from this outcome,
but if emotions are strong, any benefit to one side may be perceived as
a loss for the other, that is, reactive devaluation. Even though the
wife may have non-monetary reasons for wanting the money to be
characterized as child support (does not terminate upon remarriage,
different enforcement options), if her preference is for receiving more
dollars, and his is for the tax dollars saved, and if his preference is
even stronger than hers, there is a net gain for both with no loss, even
though their positions are opposed. Even in pure distributive bargain-
ing, there are opportunities for value-creating trades.
Both parents are better off saving the transaction costs of going to
trial so long as the agreement is within the zone of positive agreement
they have defined.49 In this case, there is further value or final settle-
ment after tentative settlement (that is, post settlement settlement) be-
cause of the different marginal tax brackets and the stronger
preference of the husband for the favorable tax treatment. Aside
from math and psychology, this outcome creates value because it ben-
efits the children who are loved by both parents and, therefore, en-
hances the family unit. In the "singed earth" climate of many divorce
cases, intelligent framing for psychological effect makes good sense.
4. Efficient Bargaining
Knowledge of the psychology of value also improves the efficiency
of negotiation. The natural reluctance to make concessions (losses)
slows down the distributive bargaining phase. Trade-offs of strong
preferences, however, are perceived as gains by each side and are eas-
ier to make. A good strategy is for each advocate to prepare a unified
dollar metric, that is, a spreadsheet for all issues under consideration,
and to continually update the trade-offs as global gains rather than
fixating on each change as an incremental loss or gain. Settlement
48. Id. at 44.
49. See Russell Korobkin, A Positive Theory of Legal Negotiation, 88 GEo. L.J.
1789, 1791-92 (2000) (describing the zone of positive agreement as the "zone defini-
tion"). The Authors note that the Zone of Positive Agreement (ZOPA) is that area of
agreement between the two parties' reservation points, within which any agreement is
better than no agreement.
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advocates can project spreadsheets from a computer for the clients to
view together and change while the overall effect is shown at the "bot-
tom line."5 If both settlement advocates agree on the data, this ob-
jective visualization of the community estate eliminates many hours of
haggling. A pre-mediation accord of the two lawyers, eliminating data
confusion, accompanied by neutral appraisals of value for all assets in
dispute would eliminate many of the problems encountered in closure.
In our many mediations, we have only seen this technique employed
once by a certified public accountant brought in as a neutral expert.
Some advocates have prepared similar presentations but never in co-
operation with their opposing counsel. Collaborative lawyers fre-
quently use these techniques.
There are other forces at play in auction bargaining. One of these
forces is the natural desire of sellers to maximize and buyers to mini-
mize, referred to as the "zero-sum" assumption; that is, every dollar
the seller gains is a dollar the buyer loses. Another powerful weapon
of influence is the reciprocity norm.5 The psychology of influence
teaches us that reciprocation governs the compromise process, which
is the basis for all bargaining.52 Once the first concession is made by a
defendant, there is a powerful social norm triggered that virtually
compels the plaintiff also to make concessions. The gifted negotiator
takes an initial position that yields a desirable final offer after a series
of carefully calibrated, reciprocal concessions.53 In the tension of op-
posing psychological forces, reciprocation trumps. We participate
knowingly in this powerful network of obligation because it has
helped us individually and societally since the dawn of humanity.54
In court-annexed mediation, the client is usually the least skilled
negotiator in the room and has an emotional or financial stake in the
outcome. The settlement advocate should be the most skilled and the
best informed on the substantive and psychological issues that must be
resolved but is partisan by definition. The mediator may actually be
the most skilled negotiator in the room because that is her specialty
while the advocate usually has to spend many working hours prepar-
ing for a possible trial as well as advocating in mediations. The media-
50. Clients are usually pleased to have a moving, visual summary of their assets
and liabilities, and clients are usually pleased to see the impact on the overall estate of
each decision they make. The more sophisticated the client, the more useful this ap-
proach. For clients who are math challenged, this technique may be necessary if deci-
sions are to be reached quickly without confusion, delay, or decision regret.
51. See KOROBKIN, supra note 31, at 184 (referring to a seminal work on negotia-
tion, HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 47 (1982), where
the process is called the "negotiation dance").
52. See id. at 185 (quoting ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRAC-
TICE (1993)); see also infra Part III.F.
53. See id. at 189-91 (quoting ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND
PRACTICE (1993)).
54. Id. at 185 (quoting ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE
(1993)).
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tor is also neutral and has the best chance of framing offers that will
be carefully considered and perhaps lead to success. In the auction
bargaining stage of settlement, tensions mount, and the threat of im-
passe looms large. The leverage of bargaining in the shadow of the
law can be an advantage if lawyers and mediators design this part of
the process to resemble a moderated settlement conference.55 The
mediator is the tribunal and sits in for the panel but has no power to
decide for the parties or to coerce them into ending the lawsuit: lever-
age without loss.
F. Will the Settlement Advocate Have a Hard Time Convincing the
Other Party, Who Thinks She Has a 50-50 Chance of Winning a
Certain Amount, to Accept an Offer of Half That Amount?
The psychophysics of value and chance distort rational decision
making.56 Although a body of social science data explains these "irra-
tional" determinants, few advocates are knowledgeable about or
skilled in applying this wisdom. Lawyers are heavily schooled and
practiced in analyzing law and making it conform to the remedies they
seek for their clients. Although negotiation is frequently employed to
settle lawsuits or to create new deals, few lawyers understand how to
turn a dispute into a deal. Legal scholars attribute this to a lack of
training in interest-based negotiation and cognitive tension between
creating and claiming value.57 The following aspects of settlement ex-
plain why lawyers can become part of the problem rather than the
solution: (1) using litigation costs to coerce the other party into sur-
rendering is an old war tactic that can work but more often postpones
or prevents settlement; (2) urging a client to compromise may seem
like a loss of faith in the case; conversely, delaying settlement rewards
the lawyer at the client's expense; and (3) puffing up the strengths of
one case and attacking the weakness of the other leads to rigid, adver-
sarial haggling.58
To address these issues, it is necessary first to understand more
about decision making. The study of decisions involves normative
analysis, that is, the logic and rationality of decision making and de-
scriptive analysis; which looks at people's actual beliefs and
preferences.59
The standard rational theory of consumer behavior assumes invari-
ance in similar situations: saving $5 on a $125 purchase (a savings of
55. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.025 (Vernon 1997).
56. See generally Robert H. Mnookin, Turn Disputes into Deals, NEGOTIATION
(Newsletter from Harv. Bus. Sch. Pub. & the Program on Negotiation, Cambridge,
Mass.), May 2004, at 1-4 (discussing influences on decisions to negotiate instead of
litigate).
57. See id. at 1.
58. See id. at 2-3.
59. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values and Frames, 39
AMER. PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 341 (1984).
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four percent) by driving an additional twenty miles is just as accept-
able as saving $5 on a $15 purchase (a savings of thirty-three and one-
third percent) by driving the same distance. Research shows that con-
sumers construct mental accounts when faced with such choices, and
they do not make rational decisions. 60 The actual choice, unlike stan-
dard economic theory, is affected by loss aversion-that in turn favors
stability over change-and by the perceived proportionate gain. Re-
search shows a systematic preference for driving twenty miles to save
one third of the purchase price but a resistance to driving that distance
to save four percent of the purchase price.61 The mental account of
the decision maker has automatically reframed the parameters of the
problem, producing opposite decision rules with identical payoffs.
In our example, given a choice to accept a certain gain of $200,000
today and avoid a loss of $75,000 in anticipated litigation costs or gam-
ble on a fifty percent chance of winning $400,000 less litigation costs in
two years, a plaintiff who has only one chance to prosper could be
expected to choose certainty over the risky future payoff. If the prob-
lem is framed by her own lawyer as a seventy-five percent chance of
winning, with no mention of litigation costs (forty percent contingent
fee plus litigation costs,) the risk assessment math looks like a
$300,000 future gain and no certain loss. For that litigator, the prefer-
ence for trying the case may be part of an overall strategy to win at
least half of the cases tried and receive forty percent plus court costs.
1. Mathematics as Persuasion vs. Costs as Coercion
Mediators often take the parties through a different risk assessment
that accounts for all costs: .75 x $400,000 = $300,000 - $120,000 contin-
gent fee = $180,000 less costs of litigation, appeal, and the missed op-
portunities for profit or pleasure as another uncertain future value. If
the defendant is offering $200,000 today, and the plaintiff's lawyer
reduces her fee to thirty percent and $2,000 court costs, there is a cer-
tain present value of $138,000 and no possibility of loss, that is, receiv-
ing a verdict of $0. If the defense lawyer were to conduct the same
exercise, the plaintiff would tend to reject the logic as adversarial posi-
tioning and suspect the mathematical conclusion due to reactive de-
valuation. Although the math is simple, the exercise is seldom
conducted by either settlement advocate in mediation. Perhaps it is
more appropriate that it comes from the mediator because the plain-
tiff needs to regard her lawyer as a warrior and does regard the other
lawyer as just that. Whatever the attitude is, once the $400,000 aspira-
tion has been embedded, accepting the $200,000 offer may seem like
losing $200,000, even though the plaintiff never had the $400,000, and
60. See id. at 347.
61. See id.
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the probabilities would favor a certain actual gain over an uncertain
future one.62
2. Compromise Is Rational vs. Advocate's Belief in Client's Case
If the responsible settlement advocate frames the other party's offer
as a certain gain for the client of $200,000, less court costs and attor-
ney's fees, pointing out that in many cases there is only a fifty-fifty
chance of winning anything and a lower chance of getting all that has
been pleaded, the client can create a mental account that favors a ra-
tional decision to settle. The new calculation of risking paying the
other party's attorney's fees when an offer of settlement under Rule
16763 has been rejected must also be factored into the realistic
probability assessment and calculation of exposure. The fact that
most lawyers receive a lower contingent fee in settlement (in the
above example, thirty percent compared to forty percent) and that
litigation costs will cease immediately are other tools to use in rational
decision making. Advocates can also point out that turning this dis-
pute into a deal creates mutual gain and prevents future loss, not only
at trial but in terms of a future business or personal relationship with
the other party or just in terms of this party's returning to positive
activities in life.
The risk-averse, onetime plaintiff, can be helped to make a rational
decision by the framing skill and expert advice of the ethical settle-
ment advocate for whom the client's best interests are paramount. If
the client knows of another plaintiff, similarly situated, who received a
generous payoff in another case (for example, television advertise-
ments of lawyers), the rational process can be impeded by the anchor-
ing and reactive devaluation discussed above.64 For the plaintiff who
has already mentally spent the $400,000 on a new house, the advocate
or the mediator can frame the compromise offer as a healthy down
payment today on that house and can walk through the cost-loss as-
sessment by referencing what it will feel like to endure two more years
of litigation and another two years of appeals to possibly receive noth-
ing for that house they could have been living in for four years.
3. Redefining the Bargaining Zone vs. Adversarial Posturing
Risky choices in the unfamiliar world of litigation require settle-
ment advocates for plaintiffs to sublimate their own desire to demon-
strate trial skill and substitute them with negotiation skill in order to
push the zone of positive agreement into the upper reaches of the
plaintiff's bargaining range. When logic is displaced by the various
62. See supra text accompanying notes 52-54.
63. TEX. R. Civ. P. 167.
64. See supra notes 27 and 29.
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psychological, strategic, and cognitive barriers previously considered
in this paper, optimal outcomes are not achieved.
There are strategies that turn disputes into deals. Some of them
have already been considered. Other strategies could also be used.
The financial incentives of the advocate should be aligned with the
client by setting a higher fee if the case is settled satisfactorily within
120 days. If the litigator is not a skilled settlement advocate, a settle-
ment counsel should be retained for that purpose. There are boutique
law firms that specialize in this service." If there is any possibility for
a future relationship with the other party that will bring gain, financial
or psychological, you should find ways to create a deal from the con-
flict and postpone hiring a trial lawyer. Before and during the litiga-
tion process, you should quantify the risks and opportunities with
rigorous decision analysis, including decision trees and dependency di-
agrams.66 Also, you should find low cost ways of gathering enough
information to stipulate to certain facts and create strategies for settle-
ment. You should assume there is a way to create more value for your
client and even for the other party; then generate options before any
concrete proposals for settlement are made. Consider your client's
resources, health, true motivation, and whether her perception of this
case could be less than the whole story. Gain the trust of your client
by giving her enough of your time and letting her hear the sound of
you listening while she tells her story until she is calm enough to let
you guide her to a strategy for settlement and ultimately a decision
that will be rational, creative, efficient, and supportive of her true
interests.
IV. CONCLUSION
Mediation and negotiation unfold in stages: (1) needs and interests
are identified; (2) options are generated to create value; (3) stories are
exchanged to permit venting and set the stage for claiming value by;
(4) exchanging proposals; (5) the proposals are evaluated; (6) impasse
occurs or closure is achieved, and, finally; (7) there is an opportunity
for increasing value before the final agreement is signed.
Four issues for settlement advocacy have been considered that track
these stages of mediation. When brainstorming options, let the form
of the process reflect the function of creating value by preparing the
client to respond creatively and convey options in the most psycholog-
ically persuasive manner. Prepare the client to tell her story to the
other side directly in a way that strengthens the case. Give each client
an opportunity for voice and coach your client to let the other side
hear the sound of her listening. Insist that the procedure provide your
client with a sense of fairness and even recognition for her point of
65. See Mnookin, supra note 56, at 3.
66. See id.
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view. When proposals are made, use either the power of the media-
tor, a trained neutral, or carefully convey the offers in a positive
frame. Evaluate and reframe offers coming to your client in a way
that diminishes the various psychological, cognitive, and strategic bar-
riers to finding a good outcome. If necessary, ask the mediator to
assist in helping the client make a more rational decision. To achieve
closure, bring enough undisputed information to the table so that a
final offer can be precisely evaluated by the client. Look for one more
low-cost-high-value way that each party can be generous to the other.
Some lawyers contend that their primary function is to protect their
clients. We believe that among the lawyer's functions is the duty to do
something for the client, not just to protect the client from something.
In many cases, a lawyer is a healer of conflict and a protector of the
client's rights. The two complementary roles, while differing in skill
sets, can be sequentially employed in the four stages of negotiation or
its relative, mediation. A client needs help and guidance to partici-
pate effectively in legal settlement processes and is entitled to an ex-
pert settlement advocate because so few cases actually require
expertise as a trial or appellate advocate.
Knowledge of the research in negotiation theory is helpful to ex-
pert, effective settlement advocacy. Some of this research is found in
non-legal sources. Many empirical studies exist that would aid law-
yers in honing their settlement skills. Mediators, who often assist liti-
gators in overcoming cognitive and psychological barriers to
settlement, also need to be familiar with negotiation theory. A zeal-
ous advocate for settlement is complying with all ethical rules when
the advocate knows that his client is best served by settlement. Do
not draw the gun if it is not needed. Extend the olive branch early.
There may be enough olives for all. You might just plant an olive
grove (create a new deal out of old conflict) to be shared or just for
the benefit of your client, who will reward your settlement advocacy
with premium fees, gratitude, and new business. You will be manifest-
ing the true purpose of advocacy: helping your client.
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